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Abstract
Fingerprint Presentation Attack Detection (FPAD) deals with distinguishing images coming
from artificial replicas of the fingerprint characteristic, made up of materials like silicone, gelatine
or latex, and images coming from alive fingerprints. Images are captured by modern scanners,
typically relying on solid-state or optical technologies. Since from 2009, the Fingerprint Liveness
Detection Competition (LivDet) aims to assess the performance of the state-of-the-art algorithms
according to a rigorous experimental protocol and, at the same time, a simple overview of the
basic achievements. The competition is open to all academics research centers and all companies
that work in this field. The positive, increasing trend of the participants number, which supports
the success of this initiative, is confirmed even this year: 17 algorithms were submitted to the
competition, with a larger involvement of companies and academies. This means that the topic is
relevant for both sides, and points out that a lot of work must be done in terms of fundamental and
applied research.
1 Introduction
In the last years, fingerprint recognition applications reached a large portion of non-expert users
thanks to the grow up of the mobile devices market. Solid-state-based micro-scanners have been
added to such devices, thus encouraging the dissemination of fingerprint verification checks and the
confidence of the users on this biometric characteristic. However, artificial fingerprint replicas, also
called spoofs, or fake fingerprints, make possible to circumvent fingerprint-based personal recogni-
tion systems. This problem involves both border control applications and personal identity verification
systems in the broad users market, with serious concerns when these systems are conceived as part of
critical infrastructures.
A Fingerprint Presentation Attack Detector or Fingerprint Liveness Detector (FLD) is a machine
learning-based system able to prevent direct attacks to the scanner, by discriminating images captured
from live fingers and those coming from fake ones. FPAD can be software based or hardware based.
If additional hardware may assure a better liveness detection rate, by measuring the blood pressure
or the heartbeat, it may be difficult to update and improve the system, if attacks are designed to
overcome such additional sensors. On the other hand, software-based approaches, which predict the
liveness degree of a certain input given the captured image, are easier to“patch” than hardware-based
ones. This is crucial when considering that the liveness detection is an arms-race problem where the
attackers are expected to gradually refine and improve their fake fingerprint fabrication ability and
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techniques. As a plethora of papers showed, dealing with the liveness detection problem by image
processing and machine learning methods, that is, software-based methods, is not trivial at all [2, 4].
Moreover, there is no general agreements about the experimental protocol and tests to be carried out
for a correct assessment of the FPADs performance. From this point of view, a great help has been
provided by the International Fingerprint Liveness Detection Competition editions from 2009 to this
last one, whose this report summarizes the basic results [2]. The greatest contribution of each compe-
tition edition is to provide up to four data sets of live and fake fingerprint images in order to support
the research community efforts in improving the FPADs’ performance. Moreover, an established ex-
perimental protocol is adopted to allow the fair comparison of the reported performance. Finally, the
most modern hardware technology, the finest fake fingerprint fabrication techniques and novel mate-
rials are possibly added every edition. Participation of academies and companies is always welcome
and encouraged. We are very proud to see that the fundamental and applied research communities are
growing up even thanks to the big efforts necessary to organize a competition like this, where expert
people is involved in fabricating thousand of spoofs, made publicly available by images captured with
different capture devices.
The goal of this report is to describe the LivDet 2017 competition characteristics and to summarize
the results achieved by the participants. Section 2 gives an overview of what we have done in this
competition edition. The evaluation protocols and participants are reported in Section 3. Section 4
discusses the competition results and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Fingerprint Presentation Attack Detection
The first paper on fingerprint presentation attacks dates back to 1998, when D. Willis and M. Lee ex-
perienced that four scanners out of six were “vulnerable” to spoofs placed on the acquisition surface
[8]. Later, Van der Putte [7] and Matsumoto [5] independently confirmed this issue, by extending
the investigation to other capture devices. Both research groups focused on the vulnerabilities of
a fingerprint recognition system caused by falsification of fingerprints. As well as the problem ap-
peared as evident, countermeasures were soon proposed. The first hardware-based solution and the
first software-base solution were published [3, 6]. From those years, fingerprint presentation attacks
detection has become one of the hottest topics in the last decades, especially from the software-based
approaches viewpoint.
The most important point in the design of FPAD system is to provide enough live and fake data to
“train” the classifier, since the problem is treated as a pattern recognition problem, where the main
modules are the capture device, the features extractor, the classifier [4]. But these modules are use-
less without a representative set of data to tune their parameters, even if the feature extraction step is
by-passed using a convolutional neural network as classifier.
Fabricating spoofs is made difficult because this task leaves a large set of freedom degrees to the
designer, from the basic method to obtain the so-called “mold”, which can be cooperative or non-
cooperative, the kind of materials adopted and the way to put the obtained spoofs (“cast”) on the
sensor’s surface [2]. A noticeable degree of cleverness and attention is necessary to find the way to
fabricate a “good” fake fingerprint.
In this LivDet edition, we focused on three main problems with the aim to make more realistic
the final reported performance. All cases are related to the possible behavior of the attackers and
the information extracted from the users’ fingerprints: (1) two groups of people were involved for
fabricating spoofs and acquiring the related images: one for the training set, one for the test set; (2)
two groups of materials were also adopted for the training set and the test set - in other words, the
test set is made up of never-seen-before materials; (3) a subset of users was shared in both training set
and test set - this choice was motivated by results reported in [1], in order to explore if user-specific
information can improve the system’s performance. The above points were not treated in the previous
editions of LivDet, whose history and results over the years are reported in [2]. Last but not least, in
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this competition edition, the increasing interest on the fingerprint presentation attacks detection kept
growing the number of participants, which is the biggest one ever reached before.
With regard to item (1), the presence of different operators for creating the fake fingerprints present
in the train set and test set allows to simulate a real application scenario in which the operator training
the system is different from the attackers. For the same reason different materials for train set and
test set have been used, according to item (2). In a realistic scenario, the system is not expected to be
trained on the same materials used for a presentation attack.
Another important difference with respect to the previous editions of the competition is the pres-
ence of some users in both the training and testing parts of the three datasets. As a matter of fact, in
the other editions, train and test sets were totally separated since none of the users were present in
both parts. However, ref. [1] showed by experiments that the presence of different acquisitions of the
same fingerprint in both parts of the dataset led to much better classification results with respect to a
system were the users in train and test were different. We called the former a “User Specific” system
and the latter a “General Purpose” one. The user specific information is particularly relevant when
designing a fingerprint presentation attacks detector which must be integrated on a fingerprint verifi-
cation system. In this case, it is expected to have some knowledges of the users stored into the system,
and this knowledge can be exploit to design a software module “intrinsically robust” to presentation
attacks when authenticating subjects.
3 Participants, data sets and protocols
3.1 Participants
The participants to the LivDet competition are universities and companies that have a biometric live-
ness detection solution. After the registration phase, each competitor must signed a database release
agreement detailing the proper usage of data made available through the competition.
In Table 1 the participants names and the correspondent algorithms names are presented as they
are used in this paper. In this competition many institutions made two software solutions. Moreover
some competitors made GPU version in order to speed up the elaboration time of the algorithm.
However this was not a constrain in the competition.
3.2 Data Sets
In order to build the data sets, we used three different scanners: Green Bit DactyScan84C, Orcanthus
Certis2 Image and Digital Persona U.are.U 5160. The scanner characteristics are reported in Table
2. Each device is more suitable for a different task. In particular, DactyScan84C is used for Italian
border controls and issuance of italian electronic documents. The U.are.U 5160 scanner is inserted in
the competition due to the possibility to use it with a mobile device. As a matter of fact we collected
the fingerprint image using the Nexus7 tablet. Certis2 Image can be embedded in a PC. For Certis2
Image the images height is not constant but depends on the finger swipe way. The use of these three
scanners allows us to simulate different application contexts.
For each of these scanner we collected few less than 6000 images. Live images came from multi-
ple acquisitions of all fingers of different subjects. The LivDet 2017 fake images were collected using
the cooperative method. Each dataset consists of two parts, the first is the train set, and the second
is the test set. The train set is used to configure the algorithm while the algorithms performance are
evaluated using the test set. Moreover, the materials used in the training set are different with respect
to the test set as we can see in Table 3. In this LivDet edition we also added a new peculiarity: the
train set fake samples are built by an operator, and the fake samples in the test set are built by two
other persons. In this way we simulate a real scenario, where the person ability that create the train
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Participants Algorithm names
Suprema ID Inc. SSLFD
Hangzhou Jinglianwen Technology Co.,Ltd JLW_A
Hangzhou Jinglianwen Technology Co.,Ltd JLW_B
OKI Brasil OKIBrB20
OKI Brasil OKIBrB30
Zhejiang University of Technology ZYL_1
Zhejiang University of Technology ZYL_2
Anonymous 0 SNOTA2017_1
Anonymous 0 SNOTA2017_2
ModuLAB. ModuLAB
Chosun University ganfp
Anonymous 1 PB_LivDet_1
Anonymous 1 PB_LivDet_2
KAIST hanulj
Anonymous 2 SpoofWit
University of Naples Federico II LCPD
CENATAV PADfV
Table 1: Name of the participants and the submitted algorithms.
Scanner Model Resolution [dpi] Image Size [px] Format Type
Green Bit DactyScan84C 500 500x500 PNG Optical
Orcanthus Certis2 Image 500 300xn PNG Thermal swipe
Digital Persona U.are.U 5160 500 252x324 PNG Optical
Table 2: Device characteristics for LivDet2017 datasets.
set is different from that of possible attackers. In our opinion the manual ability is very important in
order to attack an anti-spoofing system.
3.3 Algorithms Submission
The algorithms submission process for LivDet 2017 is same of previous editions. Each submitted
algorithm is a console application with the following list of parameters:
[nameAlgorithm].exe [ndataset] [inputfile] [outputfile]
The first parameter is the identification number of the dataset to analyze, the second is a list of absolute
paths of each image to process, and the last is the path of an output file where the algorithm saves the
classification result of every image. The scores are in the range from 0 to 100 where 0 means that
the image is fake and 100 is the maximum degree of liveness. The selected classification threshold in
order to measure the performance is 50. In case the algorithm has not been able to process the image,
the corresponding output will be -1000.
Participants trained their algorithms on the training set. We tested them on the test sets and
reported the following statistic measurements:
The parameters adopted for the performance evaluation are the followings:
• Frej_n: Rate of failure to enroll, that is, the impossibility to process the fingerprint image and
obtain the related features set.
• Fcorrlive_n: Rate of correctly classified live fingerprints.
• Fcorrfake_n: Rate of correctly classified fake fingerprints.
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Train Test
Dataset Live Wood Glue Ecoflex Body Double Live Gelatine Latex Liquid Ecoflex
Green Bit 1000 400 400 400 1700 680 680 680
Orcanthus 1000 400 400 400 1700 680 658 680
Digital Persona 999 400 400 399 1700 679 670 679
Table 3: Number of samples for each scanner and each part of the dataset.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 1: Algorithms accuracy rate of the of lives and fakes in the User Specific (US) and General
Purpose (GP) cases among using three LivDet competition scanners.
• Acc. Gelatine: Rate of the correctly detected attacks with gelatine-based spoofs.
• Acc. Latex: Rate of the correctly detected attacks with latex-based spoofs.
• Acc. Liquid Ecoflex: Rate of the correctly detected attacks with liquid ecoflex-based spoofs.
4 Discussions on the reported results
The correct classification rates of each algorithm on the LivDet test sets, including the overall average
accuracy, are summarized in Table 4. It is worth noting that all algorithms achieved over 80% accuracy
in all test sets. We can appreciate that the accuracy of the GreenBit dataset is higher than that achieved
in the other ones. This is very important because the security of national borders is a crucial issue.
A possible explanation is due to the image size given by the scanner: in Table 2, we can see that
GreenBit image size is almost twice the one of the other scanners. Thus, it may be hypothesized
that the feature extractor, or the convolutional layers of the classifiers, where employed, can analyze
more live/fake discriminating details. On the other hand, we may expect that when the sensor must be
integrated on the personal verification device on the basis of the application requirements, a solid state
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Algorithm 1 2 3 Overall
SSLFD 93.58 94.33 93.14 93.68
JLW_A 95.08 94.09 93.52 94.23
JLW_B 96.44 95.59 93.71 95.25
OKIBrB20 84.97 83.31 84.00 84.09
OKIBrB30 92.49 89.33 90.64 90.82
ZYL_1 95.91 95.13 91.66 94.23
ZYL_2 96.26 94.73 93.17 94.72
SNOTA2017_1 95.03 91.26 91.58 92.62
SNOTA2017_2 94.04 86.72 86.74 89.17
ModuLAB 94.25 90.40 90.21 91.62
ganfp 95.67 93.66 94.16 94.50
PB_LivDet_1 93.85 89.97 91.85 91.89
PB_LivDet_2 92.86 90.43 92.60 91.96
hanulj 97.06 92.34 92.04 93.81
SpoofWit 93.66 88.82 89.97 90.82
LCPD 89.87 88.84 86.87 88.52
PDfV 92.86 93.31 N.A. N.A.
Table 4: Accuracy of the algorithms on the test sets [%]. 1 = Green Bit, 2 = Digital Persona, 3 =
Orcanthus.
sensor is still preferable, at the expense of less fingerprint area to be captured. Therefore, according
to the reported results, a small drop of performance may occur.
Unfortunately, the PDAfV algorithm was not able to process the Orcanthus images and for this reason
it did not compete for the final win. This also explained that the value of 100.00% is reported on the
last row of Table 5.
Table 5 reports the details of the performance competition. It is divided in three subtables, for each
LivDet data set. The parameters in columns have been described in the previous Section.
All algorithms classified all the images, except SNOTA2017_1 which has not been able to analyze
one image from the Orcanthus dataset. For the Digital Persona test set, the majority of the algorithms
has Fcorrlive > Fcorrfake, whilst the other test sets has the Fcorrlive < Fcorrfake. This
may be not considered as a “problem” because it is probable that the threshold we adopted for the
final decision should be increased to obtain the same rate of correctly detected spoofs, at the expense
of the Fcoorlive reduction. This points out that all software-based approaches should be designed
by considering the overall application: since a false positive detection, that is, the misclassification
of a live fingerprint as a spoof, significantly impacts on the overall performance of the fingerprint
verification system, a way to set an appropriate trade-off operational points for FPAD and verification
modules should be investigated.
In Table 5 it is also worth noting the different accuracy rates related to the three never-seen-
before materials. While all the algorithms easily recognized the majority of Liquid Ecoflex fakes, the
other two materials resulted to be much tougher to classify. Latex and, even more, Gelatine strongly
contributed to the accuracy reduction. This drop of performances is particularly emphasized in the
case of the Digital Persona and Orcanthus devices.
Finally, the results of the “user specific” vs. “generic users” experiments are reported in Figures
1.a, 1.b and 1.c. In the three set of histograms, the accuracy rate of lives and fakes are reported.In
each figure the average of the four accuracy values is also presented. As expected, the presence in the
training of different acquisitions of the same fingerprint that has to be classified resulted in a better
accuracy rate. This is evident in the case of the live samples. Regarding the fake samples the accuracy
decrease is due to the different expertise of the persons in charge of their fabrication. It is worth
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Algorithm Frej Fcorrlive Fcorrfake Acc. Acc. Acc. Liquid Accuracy
[%] [%] [%] Gelatine [%] Latex [%] Ecoflex [%] [%]
G
re
en
B
it
SSLFD 0.00 94.71 92.65 85.29 95.29 98.38 93.58
JLW_A 0.00 94.47 95.59 91.47 96.03 99.26 95.08
JLW_B 0.00 96.06 96.76 91.62 98.68 100.00 96.44
OKIBrB20 0.00 81.88 87.55 77.94 85.88 99.26 84.97
OKIBrB30 0.00 91.23 93.53 90.15 94.12 98.53 92.49
ZYL_1 0.00 95.65 96.13 90.88 97.65 99.85 95.91
ZYL_2 0.00 95.94 96.52 92.94 96.91 99.71 96.26
SNOTA2017_1 0.00 95.23 94.85 93.53 92.35 99.41 95.03
SNOTA2017_2 0.00 93.76 94.26 91.62 95.44 99.41 94.04
ModuLAB 0.00 92.94 95.34 92.35 96.03 97.94 94.25
ganfp 0.00 93.53 97.45 96.47 95.88 100.00 95.67
PB_LivDet_1 0.00 93.41 94.21 88.09 94.85 99.71 93.85
PB_LivDet_2 0.00 89.23 95.88 91.76 96.18 99.85 92.86
hanulj 0.00 98.06 96.22 93.53 96.62 98.68 97.06
SpoofWit 0.00 93.70 93.63 90.29 91.62 99.41 93.66
LCPD 0.00 79.41 98.58 98.82 96.91 100.00 89.87
PDfV 0.00 92.41 93.23 86.62 94.26 98.82 92.86
D
ig
it
a
l
P
er
so
n
a
SSLFD 0.00 91.19 96.94 97.94 93.67 99.25 94.33
JLW_A 0.00 95.15 93.19 87.63 92.05 100.00 94.09
JLW_B 0.00 96.99 94.43 87.33 96.02 100.00 95.59
OKIBrB20 0.00 84.69 82.15 70.99 81.00 94.63 83.31
OKIBrB30 0.00 90.66 88.21 77.17 88.66 98.96 89.33
ZYL_1 0.00 96.75 93.79 85.86 95.58 100.00 95.13
ZYL_2 0.00 94.62 94.82 91.75 92.78 100.00 94.73
SNOTA2017_1 0.00 95.80 87.48 82.03 81.00 99.55 91.26
SNOTA2017_2 0.00 85.11 88.07 88.66 77.91 97.76 86.72
ModuLAB 0.00 93.26 88.02 85.57 80.56 98.06 90.40
ganfp 0.00 92.20 94.87 90.28 94.40 100.00 93.66
PB_LivDet_1 0.00 94.39 86.29 69.96 89.99 99.10 89.97
PB_LivDet_2 0.00 93.32 88.02 79.68 85.71 98.81 90.43
hanulj 0.00 97.52 88.02 86.60 81.30 96.27 92.34
SpoofWit 0.00 92.20 86.00 77.03 82.03 99.10 88.82
LCPD 0.00 89.72 88.12 85.27 80.41 98.81 88.84
PDfV 0.00 93.56 93.10 91.02 89.25 99.10 93.31
O
rc
a
n
th
u
s
SSLFD 0.00 91.12 94.85 91.76 96.35 96.47 93.14
JLW_A 0.00 91.47 95.24 88.97 97.26 99.56 93.52
JLW_B 0.00 93.76 93.66 83.24 98.48 99.41 93.71
OKIBrB20 0.00 86.00 82.31 79.56 74.77 92.35 84.00
OKIBrB30 0.00 93.94 87.86 79.85 90.73 93.09 90.64
ZYL_1 0.00 92.94 90.58 76.47 96.66 98.82 91.66
ZYL_2 0.00 91.12 94.90 88.24 97.11 99.41 93.17
SNOTA2017_1 0.00 91.12 91.97 81.32 95.90 98.82 91.58
SNOTA2017_2 0.03 84.88 88.31 74.56 92.55 97.94 86.74
ModuLAB 0.00 92.24 88.50 75.15 91.95 98.53 90.21
ganfp 0.00 88.47 98.96 97.65 99.24 100.00 94.16
PB_LivDet_1 0.00 89.29 94.00 89.71 95.44 96.91 91.85
PB_LivDet_2 0.00 91.53 93.51 89.56 94.07 96.91 92.60
hanulj 0.00 96.35 88.40 76.32 93.47 95.59 92.04
SpoofWit 0.00 87.65 91.92 84.71 92.25 98.82 89.97
LCPD 0.00 88.71 85.33 69.85 88.75 97.50 86.87
PDfV 100.00 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A
Table 5: Performance of all algorithms on all datasets.
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remarking that this is not a “training trick”, because we are referring to the application of fingerprint
verification when the user population is stored in the system’s database; thus the exploitation of
information coming from such users can be done.For lack of space we were unable to present all the
experimental results that will be inserted in a future complete report.
5 Conclusion
The fifth edition of LivDet 2017 proved to be a competition of increasing success. This edition fo-
cused on pointing out the relationships between obtained performance and characteristics of attackers
and users. The number of software solution is the biggest ever reached, and the performance showed
that this arms-race problem still needs a lot of work, since the best performance achieved is around
95% of correct classification rate. We hope that findings summarized in this report can be of some
helps for academies and companies working on presentation attacks detection. However, a deep anal-
ysis of these LivDet results is needed in order to better understand merits and limitations of current
state-of-the-art approaches. This will be done in a future work.
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